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STATE OF UTAH I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
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KEITH WILBURT MURPHY, 
Defendant-Appellant • 
RONALD BRENT BOUTWELL 
P. o. Box 857 
Hurricane, Utah 84737 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
-vs-
Case No. 
16412 
KEITH WILBURT MURPHY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by complaint and information 
with one count of possession of a stolen vehicle, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
(1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable 
Robert F. Owens in the Fifth Judicial District Court for 
Iron County and found guilty as charged on February 15, 
1979. Following a pre-sentence report, a sentence of one 
to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison was imposed. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower cour:' 
conviction and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 11, 197 8, while searching for a 
stolen van, police discovered appellant at 400 North 80( 
West in Cedar City sleeping in the rear of a brown 1975 
Dodge van which matched the description of the vehicle 
they were looking for (R. at 19: 13-15, 17-18). 1 
Appellant was awakened and then arrested (R. at 19: 16, 
19) • He was immediately advised of his rights pursuant 
to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (R. at 19: 19). 
Appellant claimed when he was arrested that his friend 
"Mike" allowed him to sleep in the van but would give 
no explanation of who "Mike" was or where he could be 
reached (R. at 19: 21-22). The keys to the van were in 
the ignition although it was apparent that the lock had 
been tampered with since the ignition switch came out 
with the keys (R. at 19: 23-26). 
1 Two transcripts are included within the record on 
appeal (R). They are numbered separately from the 
rest of the record and will be referred to by pag~ 
number as R. at : , the first number representing 
the page of the record at which the particular fng 
transcript begins and the second number represen 1 
the page of the transcript referred to. 
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Lori Pledger also testified that she had seen 
appellant with the van several days before he was 
arrested (R. at 19: 49). It was stipulated that 
appellant had been driving the van in which he was 
arrested (R. at 19: 50). 
It was also stipulated that the van in 
which appellant was found had been missing from the 
u & S Hotor Company parking lot for three days (R. at 
19: 32-33). A Utah vehicle registration card and 
certificate of title were introduced and were stipulated 
to pertain to the brown van in question (R. at 3, 19: 33). 
Officer Houchen testified that he had contacted Robert 
Robertson, shown on the title as owner of the van (R. at 
19: 42). 
Following the presentation of the state's 
evidence, appellant moved to dismiss the charges claiming 
that the state had failed to prove all the elements of 
the crime. The motion to dismiss was denied and the 
state was allowed to amend the information to conform 
to the evidence in that Robert and Raina Robertson were 
shown as the owners of the van, not the U & S Motor 
Company as the information had originally stated. 
-3-
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Defendant then testified, although his 
testimony was not made a part of the record on 
appeal. 
After deliberating, the jury found appellant 
guilty as charged of receiving stolen property. Follow· 
ing a pre-sentence report, appellant was sentenced to 
a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, 
provides: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT 1 S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED SINCE THE STATE HAD 
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953), as amended, 
A person commits theft if he 
receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it 
has been stolen, or believing that it 
probably has been stolen. 
The elements may thus be stated as: 
(1) the actor must receive, retain, or dispos: 
of the property of another; and 
(2) the actor must know the property has beer 
stolen or believe the property to probably have been 
stolen. 
-4-
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The evidence in the instant matter indicated 
that appellant had been driving the van several days 
before his arrest (R. at 19: 49). Appellant was 
sleeping in the van with the keys in the ignition the 
morning he was arrested (R. at 19: 14-15, 23). In 
spite of his assertion that his friend "Mike" had 
allowed him to sleep in the van, appellant would give 
no indication as to who "Mike" was or where he could 
be reached (R. at 19: 21-22). There was certainly 
enough evidence to reasonably inf er that appellant 
retained or possessed the van. 
It was stipulated that the van had been 
missing for three days (R. at 19: 32-33). In Barnes 
v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 839-840 (1973), the 
United States Supreme Court approved of the following 
jury instruction: 
• possession of recently 
stolen property, if not satisfactorily 
explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the 
inference and find, in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the 
evidence of the case, that the person 
in possession knew the property had 
been stolen. 
-5-
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The Court also noted: 
In the present case we deal 
with a traditional common-law 
inference deeply rooted in our law. 
For centuries courts have instructed 
juries that an inference may be drawn 
from the fact of unexplained possession 
of stolen goods. 
Id. at 833. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also noted: 
• it is a fact of life that 
one in possession of stolen property 
who makes no explanation as to how he 
came to be in possession is apt to be 
under some adverse consideration as to 
his honesty;and if he has an explanation 
as to how he innocently came into 
possession of the stolen property, he 
would certainly improve his situation by 
giving his account of how it happened to 
the jury. 
State v. Burr, 579 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1978). 
Although the holding of the Court in ~· 
Burr was that a defendant need not put on affirmative 
evidence to rebut a presumption created by his possessic: 
of stolen goods, it does not go so far as to rule out 
the type of inference allowed in Barnes v. United S~ 
supra. Appellant's unexplained possession on several 
occasions of the van which was stipulated to have been 
missing for several days plus the fact that the ignitio: 
lock had been tampered with all could have reasonably 
-6-
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indicated to the jury that appellant knew the van 
was or probably was stolen. 
In a similar case, the Wyoming Supreme 
court noted that the widely accepted rule is that 
possession of recently stolen goods alone is 
damning evidence of guilt. Russell v. State, 583 
P.2d 690, 695 (Wyo. 1978). That court also held: 
When the State introduces 
evidence on its case-in-chief from 
which the jury may properly infer the 
essential elements of the crime, the 
State has then made out a "prima 
face case," impregnable against a 
motion for acquittal. 
Id. at 695. 
In the instant matter the State had 
clearly presented evidence from which the jury 
could have inferred the elements of the crime 
charged. Consequently, the lower court acted 
properly in denying appellant's motion to 
dismiss. 
-7-
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provides: 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ALLOWING AN AMENDMENT TO THE INFORMATION 
AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE AND 
REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT MORE TIME 
TO MEET THE AMENDED INFORMATION. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-17-3, (1953, as amended), 
An information may be amended, without 
leave of court, in any matter of form 
or substance at any time before the defendant 
pleads thereto. It may also be amended 
in any matter of form or substance, by leave 
of court, at any time after the defendant 
has pleaded to the merits, or during the 
trial. In case an amendment is allowed 
after a plea or during the trial, the 
court shall give the defendant such 
reasonable time as may be necessary to 
meet the new matter set up in the amendment 
(emphasis added) . 
This Court considered this statute in State v. Rohletter, 11!: 
Utah 452, 160 P.2d 963, 964, (1945): 
Section 105-17-3, Utah Code Ann., 
(1943), governs amendments in criminal 
cases. It provides that an information 
may be amended with leave of the court 
as to matter of substance or form 
during the trial. However, in State v. 
Rickenburg, 58 Utah 270, 198 P.2d 767 
(1921), we held that under this statute 
no amendment could be made which would 
essentially alter the nature of the 
case, so to prejudice the defendant in 
making his defense. This was affirmed 
in State v. Caputo, 69 Utah 266, 254 P. 
(1927). 
-8-
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see also State v. Sommers, Utah No. 16016, filed July 6, 
1979. A recent Illinois case has also indicated that: 
Variance between allegations of a 
charge and evidence which can affect 
a criminal trial are limited to differences 
between the pleading of essential elements 
of a crime and the proof . . . (cites 
omitted) ... To vitiate a criminal 
trial, however, a variance must be 
material and of such character that it 
mislead a defendant in the making of his 
defense or exposes him to double jeopardy 
. . . . The variance must result in 
substantial injury to a defendant either 
by causing a jury to be misled or by 
hindering the defendant in the intelligent 
presentation of his case. Where 
property of another is involved, a variance 
between allegations of ownership and proof 
is not fatal if evidence shows that rights 
of possession and ownership of t:1e property 
are in some person, legal or natural, other 
than the defendant. 
People v. Bristow, 8 Ill. App. 3d 798, 291 N.E. 2d 189, 192 
(1972). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-8 (1953), as amended, 
all an information is required to state is the name of the 
offense, the statutory designation of the offense, or the 
basic definition of the offense with which the defendant has 
been charged. consequently, an information for receiving 
stolen goods does not need to identify who actually owns 
the property in question under Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-16 
(1953, as amended) , which states: 
-9-
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An information or indictment 
need contain no allegation of the 
ownership of any property, unless 
such allegation is necessary to 
charge the offense under section 
77-21-8. 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann., § 77-21-20, states: "An informa:r 
or indictment need not state any matter not necessary to 
be proved." The elements of receiving stolen property don:: 
include specific ownership of the property, only if that 
ownership is with someone other than the defendant. Since 
ownership of the van was not a necessary allegation in the 
information, any allegation to that effect can be regarded 
as surplusage. (Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-42 (1953), as amende 
"Any allegation unnecessary under the existing law or under 
the provisions of this chapter, may, if contained in an 
information, indictment, or bill of particulars, be disregam 
as surplusage.") 
A change in a portion of the information which was 
surplusage could hardly be characterized as changing the 
nature of the case. The same property was still alleged 
as having been received; the same crime was still charged: 
the same proof was still relied upon to establish the 
elements of the crime. It had already been stipulated that 
the van had been missing from the u & s Motor parking lot 
for three days (R. at 19, 32-33). It was apparent that the 
van did not belong to the defendant. The change of the 
-10-
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--
alleged identity of the owners of the van to conform to 
the proof did not alter appellant's case. 
Additional support for the lower court's action in 
allowing the prosecution to amend the information following 
the presentation of its case is found in Utah Code Ann., 
§ 77-21-43 ( 1953, as amended): 
(2) No variance between 
those allegations of an information, 
indictment or bill of particulars, 
which state the particulars of the 
offense, whether amended or not, and 
the evidence offered in support 
thereof shall be qrounds for the acquittal 
of the defendant. The court may at any 
time cause the information, indictment 
or bill of particulars to be amended 
in respect to any such variance, to 
conform to the evidence. 
(3) If the court is of the 
opinion that the defendant has been 
prejudiced in this defense upon the 
merits by any such defect, imperfection 
or omission or by any variance the court 
may because of such defect, imperfection, 
omission or variance, unless the defendant 
objects, postpone the trial, to be had 
before the same or another jury on such 
terms as the court considers proper. In 
determining whether the defendant has 
been prejudiced in his defense upon the 
merits, the court shall consider all 
the circumstances of the case and the 
entire course of the prosecution. 
(4) No appeal, or motion made after 
verdict, based on any such defect, im-
perfection, omission or variance shall 
be sustained unless it is affirmatively 
shown that the defendant was in fact 
prejudiced thereby in his defense upon 
the merits. 
(emphasis added) . 
-11-
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The lower court considered appellant's motion to dismiss a' 
r.. 
objection to the variance and found no prejudice. The 
effect of the change was to make appellant feel compelled 
to testify (Appellant's Brief at p. 14) , and to take away 
his argument that the state had failed to show ownership 
in someone other than appellant. Neither of these effects 
would so substantially prejudice appellant as to require 
reversal or a new trial. 
Appellant also claims the prosecutor acted ~b~ 
faith in withholding a bill of sale showing that the van in 
question had been sold by the Robertson's to U & S Motor 
Company (R. at 18). A consideration of the bill of sale ani 
the certificates of title (R. at 3), indicates that who had 
legal title was in doubt. As has been noted above, it made! 
no difference to the state's case who had title to the van. 
The state needed only to show that the van was missing from 
someone. The change in the information did not undermine ' 
I 
any affirmative defense of appellant. 
The bill of sale was not evidence "favorable to 
appellant." Appellant claims that had he been given more 
time, he could have obtained the bill of sale and other 
:witnesses and shown that u & s Motor Company owned the van, 
.i 
the Robertsons (Appellant's brief at p. 9). 
I 
It is difflcul:, 
to see how this would have helped appellant. It would simpi 
more explic have made the fact that the van had been stolen 
-12-
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l: 
There was no reason to have delayed the trial or 
to have disallowed the change. Consequently, the trial 
court acted properly in allowing the amendment to the 
information at the close of the state's case and refusing 
to allow more time for appellant to meet the amended information. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's motion to dismiss at the close of 
the state's case was properly denied since the state had made 
out a prima facie case of receiving stolen property. There 
was no error in allowing the information to be amended to 
conform to the evidence since the portion changed was 
surplusage ·and did not change the nature of the offense 
charged. Moreover, appellant's case was.not prejudiced by 
the change. Appellant was not harmed by the failure of the 
prosecutor to introduce evidence since the evidence was not 
clearly favorable to him and was not central to the elements 
of the crime charged. 
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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